The long arm of the union: Norway and Switzerland, and their interpretation of state sovereignty in their relationship with the European Union by Jansen, Rik
 THE LONG ARM OF THE UNION 
Norway and Switzerland, and their interpretation of state sovereignty in their 
relationship with the European Union 
 
 
  
10 JANUARY 2019 
R. JANSEN, BA 
S2152916 
POLITICAL SCIENCE: INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION 
LEIDEN UNIVERSITY 
FIRST SUPERVISOR: PROF. DR. A.C. VERDUN 
SECOND READER: DR. K.M. POMORSKA 
9980 WORDS 
 
1 
 
Abstract 
This article looks at two different affiliated non-members of the European Union (EU): 
Norway and Switzerland. They are eligible to become members of the EU, but a majority 
of the people of both countries decided through referendums not to apply for membership. 
Instead, they both have established a committed relationship with the EU through 
multiple agreements in order to gain unhindered access to the European single market. 
This article investigates the way in which these countries have interpreted state 
sovereignty in their relation with the European Union. The research question is: to what 
extent are Norway and Switzerland able to maintain their sovereignty in their relationship 
with the European Union? Sovereignty is operationalized by looking for cases of special 
deals in these relationships with the EU, which signifies the ability to exert control over 
the affected policy areas. The article analyzes the European Economic Area (EEA) 
Agreement for Norway and Bilateral Agreements I (1999) for Switzerland. The Norway-
case is covered through secondary sources and the Swiss-case through process tracing of 
the official agreements. The findings in the Norway-case show no unique deals between 
the EU and Norway that benefit the country, except for some small ones in the agriculture 
sector and fisheries. The findings provide evidence that Switzerland has been able to 
strike special deals in certain policy areas that are covered by the relationship with the 
EU. Thus, Switzerland has been able to maintain more of its state sovereignty in its 
relationship with the EU than Norway. 
 
I. Introduction  
Why do countries seek to maintain sovereignty? Over the past few decades, countries 
have had differing relations with the EU. Most European countries have become member 
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states, while some have decided not to become members. Some countries in this last 
category instead agreed to maintain a (close) relationship with the EU; they have become 
affiliated with the EU. Recently, a majority of the citizens of the United Kingdom (UK) 
that cast their vote favoured to leave the EU. As a result, if the UK were to leave the EU, 
the country will create a new type of relationship with the EU: the ex-member. The core 
slogan of the Leave-campaign was “take back control,” which referred to the ability of 
the country to have more sovereign power (Gamble 2018, 1216). Some of the affiliated 
countries also chose, following a popular referendum, not to become a member. Often, 
voices in the no-campaigns of these countries were referring to this notion of sovereignty 
as well. One important question to ask then is: to what extent have these countries been 
able to protect this national sovereignty? 
 
EFTA-Members 
Four of these affiliated countries — Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland — 
are part of a European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) and the first three are also part of 
the EEA. The EEA, of which the agreement was signed in 1992 and was established in 
1994, is concerned with the European internal market. The EEA is an economic area that 
includes the EU and the EFTA countries, whereby the three EFTA members have 
unhindered access to the European single market.  
Norway is the largest of the three EFTA EEA members and a small majority of 
the population voted to reject EU membership on two occasions (1972 and 1994) in 
referendums. As a result, the EEA Agreement is the basis of Norway’s relationship with 
the EU. Switzerland is, as an EFTA member, not a member of the EU and is also not a 
member of the EEA. Just as Norway, Switzerland held a referendum, in 1992, on closer 
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relations with the EU, by asking citizens to vote on the desirability of EEA membership. 
On 6 December 1992, this membership was rejected by a small majority of the population 
that cast their vote, 50.34% to 49.66%, and Switzerland opted out of the EEA Agreement. 
Following this referendum, Switzerland closed the door towards negotiations on full EU 
membership. Instead, Switzerland started negotiating its relationship with the EU through 
several sets of bilateral agreements.  
As in the case of the UK, one of the main reasons in both countries for the people 
to vote to stay out of the EU was the fear of loss of sovereignty (Fossum 2009, 2; 
Kużelewska 2013). The reasoning behind this fear was that by becoming a member of the 
EU, the countries would have to give up a part of their state sovereignty. I explain this 
concept of state sovereignty further in section 2.4, but in short, it refers to the ability of a 
state to exert its control independently over its own policy areas. At the same time, these 
countries did choose to have a close relation with the EU, because the relationship ensures 
them unhindered access to the internal market of the EU. But how far does the arm of the 
EU reach? One consequence of the free access to the single market could still be a loss of 
state sovereignty. In order to find out if this loss is the case for Norway and Switzerland, 
this article analyzes the extent to which these affiliated non-members have been able to 
maintain some kind of control over the policy areas affected by their relationship with the 
EU. The article attempts to answer the question: to what extent are Norway and 
Switzerland able to maintain their sovereignty in their relationship with the European 
Union? 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: in section II, I provide an 
overview of the existing literature related to the different relations between the EU and 
third countries, more specifically on the cases of Norway and Switzerland, and of the 
4 
 
literature related to the notion of sovereignty. Then, in section III I explain the way in 
which state sovereignty is operationalized and analyzed for the two cases of Norway and 
Switzerland. In section IV, I explain my findings from secondary sources on the Norway-
case and in section V, I follow with a discussion on the consequences of these findings 
for Norwegian state sovereignty. In section VI, I present my findings from the first set of 
bilateral agreements between Switzerland and the EU, and in section VII, I analyze these 
findings and their effect on Switzerland’s state sovereignty. In section VIII, I conclude 
with some final remarks on sovereignty and possibilities for future research. 
 
II. EU Non-Member Affiliation  
2.1 EU Partnership in a Broader Context 
Currently, the EU maintains six different types of relations with third states that, as 
explained by Gstöhl, differ in “both the substance of the internal market which they cover 
and their degree of [institutionalization]” (2015, 20). What becomes apparent in the nature 
of these relationships is explained by John E. Fossum and Hans P. Graver in their book 
Squaring the Circle on Brexit (2018). They explain that affiliated non-members often 
have to comply with the EU rules and regulations if they want to have access to the 
European market on any level, even if they have explicitly decided not to become a 
member state. Furthermore, according to the authors the basic assumption in these EU-
relations is that “the closer (in breadth and depth terms) the affiliation, the stricter the 
requirements” (2018, 29). As a result, “the EU sets down quite explicit conditions for the 
relevant types of access … and insists on mechanisms to ensure that states operate in 
accordance with what they have committed themselves to do in relation to the EU (2018, 
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29-30). In other words, the EU sets the ground rules of the relationships it holds with non-
members and the partner countries simply have to accept these rules. 
Norway and Switzerland, both non-members, have a close affiliation with the EU 
and both would be eligible to join. In reality, however, the relationships differ. Norway, 
on the one hand, has chosen to maintain a close relation with the EU through the EEA 
Agreement, instead of becoming a member. Switzerland, on the other hand, has 
established a relationship with the EU through sixteen bilateral agreements regarding 
various sectors, instead of full membership (Gstöhl 2015, 23).  
 
2.2 Norway and the EEA Agreement 
The EEA Agreement itself has been covered by other authors that focused on, for 
example, the bargaining process leading up to its creation (Gstöhl 1994) and its 
procedures of incorporating EU legislation (Fredriksen 2012). More specifically, the 
relationship between Norway and the EU has been extensively researched by academic 
authors. For example, some have focused on the legal aspects (Fredriksen 2015), some 
on regional aspects (Østhagen and Raspotnik 2017) and others on the consequences for 
the Norwegian constitution (Eriksen 2015; Holmøyvik 2015). 
Most of these authors touch upon, or explicitly mention, the notion of (state) 
sovereignty in relation to the EEA Agreement. Different authors in the book The 
European Union’s Non-Members (Eriksen and Fossum, eds. 2015) cover the relationships 
the EU has with third countries. Some focus specifically on the Norway-case in line with 
the notion of (state) sovereignty (Eriksen 2015; Egeberg and Trondal 2015; Fossum 2015; 
Holmøyvik 2015). The general consensus from these articles is that due to its dynamic 
nature, the EEA Agreement itself affects Norway’s sovereignty in a number of ways. The 
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authors cover the EEA and its the effects on Norwegian democracy (Eriksen 2015; 
Holmøyvik 2015), on administrative sovereignty (Egeberg and Trondal 2015), and on 
political representation (Fossum 2015). 
The dynamic character of the EEA Agreement and its effect on Norway’s 
sovereignty is the core point of analysis in Fossum and Graver (2018). They provide a 
thorough analysis of the Norwegian EFTA EEA membership and analyze the Norwegian 
EEA membership as a possibility for the UK if it is to leave the EU. They attempt to 
construct a model for “ex-EU members;” a new type of EU-relationship (2018, xii). This 
book focuses extensively on the case of Norway, especially in relation to this notion of 
state sovereignty. 
 
2.3 Switzerland and the Bilateral Agreements 
Previous authors have focused on the unique relationship that Switzerland has with the 
EU (Blatter 2015; Lavenex 2009; Lavenex and Schwok 2015; Tovias 2006; Vahl and 
Grolimund 2006). Switzerland is different from the other EFTA states, because the Swiss 
voted to stay out of the EEA in 1992 through a referendum, and that “the relationship to 
the EU is instead based on two [sets of] bilateral agreements” and consist of a “unique … 
form of sectoral bilateralism” (Eriksen and Fossum 2015, 11).  
There are authors that provide an analysis on the significance of Swiss European 
integration (Goetschel 2003) and the bilateral relationship between Switzerland and the 
EU (Lavenex and Schwok 2015; Vahl and Grolimund 2006). Some analyze the 
relationship as a possibility for other states (Tovias 2006), while others cover the sectoral 
bilateralism itself. For example, they analyze the way in which, on paper, the relationship 
appears to have a more static nature, which “[promises] a stronger preservation of Swiss 
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sovereignty vis-à-vis the EU than the more comprehensive, dynamic and hierarchical 
EEA” (Lavenex and Schwok 2015, 43). However, these authors explain that, in practice, 
the bilateral relationship is still more dynamic than static. A dynamic relationship would 
suggest that Switzerland has to adopt the EU acquis communautaire, which is the “body 
of common rights and obligations that is binding on all EU member states,” in order to 
maintain unhindered access to the internal market (European Commission 2016). 
Another analysis of the bilateral agreements is provided by Joachim Blatter, who 
focuses on Switzerland’s specific direct democracy. He explains that, from a classic 
republican perspective, it makes sense for the country to maintain its “direct-democratic 
veto rights” instead of a “[representation] in rule-shaping and -making in Brussels,” 
which would happen if the country were to become an EU member (2015, 52). He 
concludes that this ability to maintain the direct-democratic veto rights is possibly the 
basis for the perspective of the majority of the Swiss on the bilateral relationship with the 
EU, instead of full EU membership or an EEA membership.  
Marius Vahl and Nina Gorlimund cover the first and second sets of bilateral 
agreements extensively, both on the functioning as well as on the implementation (2006). 
The book covers most of the aspects related to the bilateral agreements and their effects 
on Switzerland and focuses on the first set of bilateral agreements. They provide a 
thorough overview of the content of this first set of bilateral agreements, but do not 
describe or analyze the consequences of these agreements for Switzerland’s state 
sovereignty. 
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2.4 Sovereignty 
In this article, sovereignty refers to the notion of executive autonomy over policy areas 
in a country, and the ability to act independently and without interference from others in 
those policy areas. This definition refers back to the old “Westphalian” notion of 
sovereignty, which, as explained by Rudolph, is concerned with “political authority 
within a distinct territory that excluded external actors from domestic authority 
structures” (2005, 4). Eriksen explains this broad notion of state sovereignty as: “[s]tate 
sovereignty refers to the interests and willpower … and refers to the status that states are 
granted under classic international law … It is the right that states have in relation to other 
states, concerning their control of territory and inhabitants, which includes the right to 
issue orders backed by threats” (2015, 82). More recent concerns about globalization and 
interdependence have contested this notion of sovereignty, as states appear to ‘give up’ 
sovereignty (Jackson 2003). Fossum and Graver argue that in the EU-context the classical 
Westphalian notion of state sovereignty is no longer applicable, due to the economic 
interdependent context of the EU (2018, 29). 
What has happened with sovereignty in the context of the EU is what Keohane 
and Hoffmann call “pooling sovereignty” (1991, 7). They explain that the EU, or at time 
the European Community (EC), has accelerated “its practice of ‘pooling sovereignty’ 
through incremental change” (1991, 7). The ‘pooling of sovereignty’ means: “sharing the 
capability to make decisions among governments, through a process of qualified majority 
rule. For issues on which sovereignty is pooled, authority to make decisions is removed 
from individual states” (1991, 7). This process, then, takes the ability to exert control 
independently away from individual states and places the ability in the hands of the 
collective, in this case the EU. 
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On the occurrence of pooling sovereignty Martin Loughlin goes one step further 
as he argues that “[t]he sovereign rights of member states are not simply pooled by 
consent; they are also curtailed by virtue of integration through law” in order to continue 
European integration (2016, 73). As a consequence, “the capacity of a member state to 
rule by means of law is restricted by virtue of novel rights and obligations declared by the 
Court of Justice and which assume priority over domestic law” (2016, 73). This restriction 
leads to what he calls the “erosion of sovereignty” (2016, 73). He continues to explain 
that the “erosion of sovereignty” is caused by the “integrationist agenda” set by EU 
institutions that use, in order to achieve this agenda, an “instrumentalization of law, 
without the explicit authorization of member states” (2016, 73). By choosing to stay 
outside the EU, Norway and Switzerland decided not to pool their sovereignty and avoid 
this ‘erosion of sovereignty,’ but instead make their own agreements in order to gain free 
access to the European single market. 
However, Kux and Sverdrup (2000) argue that even affiliated non-member states 
are affected by the role of ‘Europeanization’ across formal EU borders. They define 
Europeanization as “a process under which European-level institutions and policy-
making grow in importance relative to those at the level of nation states … and it demands 
substantial institutional reorganization and policy adaptation at the domestic level” (2000, 
238). They use Norway and Switzerland as their cases to show this extension of 
Europeanization “beyond the formal boundaries of the EU” (2000, 240). In other words, 
they explain that through the close affiliation with the EU, the sovereignty of both 
countries has been affected by EU legislation, more so in Norway than in Switzerland 
(2000, 260). Even though the analysis of the two cases is thorough and adds significantly 
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to the discussion on state sovereignty, the article was written in 2000 and does not cover 
the bilateral agreements between the EU and Switzerland to its full extent. 
In this article I focus on the notion of state sovereignty as the ability of a state to 
control its own territory independently and negotiate its own agreements with the EU, 
while at the same time being (inter)dependent on the unhindered access to the European 
single market. Norway and Switzerland appear to be, on the one hand, holding on to the 
Westphalian notion of sovereignty, but, on the other hand, also want to be as close as 
possible to the EU, and as a result have had to give up some of that sovereignty. Although 
the case of Norwegian EEA membership has been thoroughly analyzed on the notion of 
state sovereignty, the literature on the bilateral Swiss-EU relations is not as extensive and 
falls short on a full discussion on this issue. 
 
III. Operationalizing State Sovereignty 
I analyze two different cases of affiliated non-members of the EU: Norway, as an EEA 
member, and Switzerland, as a bilateral partner. Although EU member states formally 
have to pool sovereignty in the EU, pooling sovereignty is not necessary for affiliated 
non-members. But, what effect does the affiliation with the EU have on their sovereignty? 
The premise of this article is that both countries have established agreements with the EU 
and have gained free access to the European single market, but wanted to maintain a part 
of their state sovereignty in these relations. Both countries retain sovereignty in theory, 
because both could withdraw from the agreements and they remain the official authority 
that could act in one way or another. However, in the remainder of this article, I examine 
the specific effects of these agreements on the state sovereignty in practice. So, in what 
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way the relationships affect the ability to act independently of these two countries in 
certain policy areas. 
In order to operationalize the concept of state sovereignty, I investigate to what 
extent the countries have been able to strike deals that differ from EU membership, and 
help the country to retain its power to act independently. I analyze whether there are 
exceptions within the agreements the EU has with both Norway and Switzerland. If so, 
that could qualify as evidence that these countries are able to assert their state sovereignty, 
and maintain the ability to act independently and without restrictions in those policy areas 
affected by agreements. In the case of Norway, the focus of the analysis is on its role in 
the EEA Agreement. In the case of Switzerland, the focus is on the first set of sectoral 
agreements: Bilateral Agreements I (1999). 
To investigate the case of Norway I mainly use secondary sources, as other authors 
have covered this case extensively in relation to sovereignty (Eriksen 2015; Fossum and 
Graver 2018; Gstöhl 2015; Kux and Sverdrup 2000). One of the main sources of 
information is Fossum and Graver’s book and their analysis of Norway as a possible 
model for the UK after it leaves the EU. 
There is not the same amount of comprehensive studies on the EU-Swiss 
relationship. Therefore, I use process tracing to provide a within-case analysis of the 
bilateral agreements. Process tracing allows me to analyze and explain a part of the 
relationship Switzerland has with the EU in relation to sovereignty. The theoretical 
starting point for process tracing is the assumption that being a member of the EU, or 
having a close relationship with the EU, affects state sovereignty. The first set of bilateral 
agreements serves as empirical evidence, to analyze whether Switzerland’s sovereignty 
is affected. In line with Derek Beach’s explanation of the role of process tracing I adopt 
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this research method “… for tracing causal mechanisms using detailed within-case 
empirical analysis of how a causal process plays out in an actual case” (2017, 2). This 
paper is concerned with the causal mechanisms in the case of Switzerland. The cause in 
this situation is Switzerland’s unhindered access to the European single market, the 
outcome is the affected state sovereignty, and the causal mechanisms that are being traced 
are the bilateral agreements.  
The subject of analysis in the Swiss-case is Bilateral Agreements I (1999), which 
consists of seven sectoral agreements. The focus of this paper is on these seven 
documents, which limits the scope of the research to the formal and legal language of the 
bilateral relationship. As a result, this paper leaves out the practical discourse and 
implications of the agreements. Generally, a relationship with the EU affects a country’s 
ability to exert control over the concerned policy area. Therefore, I analyze the texts of 
the bilateral agreements in order to trace if there are parts in these documents that signify 
a special deal between the EU and Switzerland. It is also possible that the text signifies a 
(complete) copy of the EU’s acquis communautaire. This signifier becomes visible when 
the articles in the text mention a ‘Council Regulation’ as the point of departure. This 
exercise allows me to operationalize the term ‘sovereignty’ in the analysis of the texts. If 
the latter of the two signifiers occurs, it suggests that Switzerland has not been able to 
exert its state sovereignty in that bilateral agreement. If the former of the two becomes 
visible, it suggests that Switzerland has been able to maintain (a part of) its ability to act 
independently in that particular issue and it would suggest a limitation to the extent of 
which sovereignty is affected. Even though these signifiers do not necessarily say 
anything about the practical implications of the agreements, formally they indicate that 
Switzerland has been able to have a relationship with the EU and gain unhindered access 
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to the single market, but has preserved a portion of its state sovereignty in this 
relationship.  
In the following section, I first present the findings in relation to the Norway-
model through secondary sources and discuss the implications in relation to state 
sovereignty. Then, I present the findings in relation to the Swiss-model and discuss these 
in regard to state sovereignty (see Table 1 below for a comprehensive overview of the 
findings and lessons learnt of both countries).  
 
IV. Norway and the EEA Agreement 
Norway has a deeply rooted relationship with the EU. Fossum and Graver explain that 
“Norway is associated with the EU through more than 130 agreements” and, as a result, 
has absorbed around three-quarters of EU law when compared to full EU members (2018, 
41). The EEA Agreement plays a large role in this relationship and the agreement holds 
a core section that includes 129 articles, with 49 protocols and 22 annexes (Fossum and 
Graver 2018). The EEA includes all EU member states and three of the four EFTA 
members: Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway. Its aim is to extend the European single 
market to third parties. Nevertheless, the agreement is not as extensive as EU 
membership, because it is “not a supranational legal order” and “the EFTA states retain, 
formally speaking, their legislative and judicial sovereignty” (2018, 42). 
Fossum and Graver clarify that the premise of the EEA Agreement is public 
international law, which ensures that “national law determines the extent to which 
international law is to have effect in the internal legal orders national law” (2018, 67). 
This premise means for the EFTA countries that “EU’s legislation — in contrast to the 
situation in the member states — is not formally anchored in the legal precepts of  
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Table 1. Main findings and lessons learnt of EU relationship with Norway and Switzerland 
Norway – EEA Agreement Switzerland – Bilateral Agreements 
Formal EEA institutions (ESA, EFTA Court) 
incorporate EU law. 
No formal institutions are created, except for 
the independent authority that oversees the 
agreement on government procurement. The 
ECJ oversees compliance only in Civil 
Aviation Agreement. 
EEA Joint Committee: provides the ability to 
help shape new EU decisions, but all EFTA 
countries have one combined vote, EU has the 
other vote. So, Norway has one fourth of the 
votes in this Committee. 
Sectoral Joint Committees for each bilateral 
agreement: Switzerland has one vote, EU the 
other. So, Switzerland has half of the votes in 
these Committees. 
Agreement is as valid as Norwegian law. No formal application of EU law in 
Switzerland. 
Main part of the initial agreement is not 
renegotiated each time EU adopts new 
legislation. 
Parts of/Entire initial agreement are/is 
renegotiated each time EU adopts new 
legislation. 
Norway has the formal ability to reject new 
EU legislation, but has never used this right. 
New EU legislation is presented as ‘take it or 
leave it.’ 
Switzerland (and the EU) can terminate one of 
the agreements at any time, which allows the 
Swiss more flexibility, but doing so would 
also terminate all of the other agreements. 
Dynamic character of the agreement: new EU 
legislation is added through annexes to the 
original agreement. 
Static character of the agreements due to 
sectoral approach and renegotiation of 
agreements when new EU legislation is 
applicable. 
Some sectors, most importantly agriculture 
and fisheries, are excluded from the original 
agreement, but through annexes have (partly) 
been included. 
Each sectoral agreement affects (part of) one 
sector. Large part of these agreements take EU 
legislation as the point of departure. 
Norway does not have any decision-making 
influence on (new) EU regulations, but most 
of the time it has to adopt it. 
Switzerland does not have any decision-
making influence on EU regulations. 
The formal status of non-member provides 
Norway symbolic sovereignty. 
The formal status of non-member provides 
Switzerland symbolic sovereignty. 
Norway maintains the ability to strike trade 
deals with third countries jointly with the 
EFTA members. The EEA does not cover the 
Common Trade Policy of the EU. 
Switzerland maintains the ability to strike 
trade deals with third countries. 
Norway has been able to exclude subsidy 
policies on agriculture and the control over 
marine sources from the EEA Agreement  
Switzerland has struck special deals in: 
agriculture, freedom movement of persons, 
overland transport and government 
procurement. 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
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supremacy and direct effect” (2018, 45). Nevertheless, the agreement does incorporate 
“EU legislation … and duties to ensure that EEA rules are given effect in national law 
and the ways in which EU legislation is valid in the member states” (2018, 67). This 
incorporation means that the EEA Agreement plays a similar role in the EFTA countries, 
and has a similar content as EU law in member states, despite the previously mentioned 
premise.  
Moreover, Fossum and Graver illustrate that, in Norway specifically, the 
agreement has become part of national law and is as “‘valid as Norwegian law’” (2018, 
70). The EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA), an institution that oversees the practical 
implementation of the EEA Agreement and its amendments, “ensures that legal 
incorporation is in accordance with EU law” (2018, 45). Furthermore, the EFTA Court is 
formally a separate court from the European Court of Justice (ECJ), but “in practice 
ensures the incorporation of EU law” in the EFTA countries (2018, 45). 
Another element of the EEA Agreement is that, as the EU expands and advances 
by creating new legislation to deal with additional issues, the EEA develops with it. 
Eriksen explains that the main part of the initial agreement consists of a “dynamic 
framework … that does not need to be renegotiated whenever the EU adopts a new 
regulation. The agreement is continually updated so that the laws and regulations remain 
consistent throughout the EEA” (2015, 87). What Fossum and Graver note is that 
formally, “[t]he EEA Agreement does not oblige the EFTA states to take on new EU 
legislation, but thus far in the 23 years of the EEA’s existence Norway has never used its 
right to reject an update of the agreement” (2018, 90).  
New EU legislation is added to the agreement through annexes. These annexes 
are included in the main agreement and, as a result, over 11,000 new EU laws have been 
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added to the agreement since 1992 (Fossum and Graver 2018). The legislation is formally 
not incorporated straight away, but is discussed in the EEA Joint Committee (EJC) before 
implementation. This EJC was constructed with the signing of the EEA Agreement and 
consists of representatives from the three EFTA countries and the EU. Gstöhl clarifies 
that discussion on new EU legislation happens “in the so-called decision-shaping phase 
after the EC transmitted its proposal to the EU Council and the European Parliament as 
well as to the EEA EFTA states” (2015, 21). Fossum and Graver explain that, in practice, 
whenever a new EU legislation is created that is relevant for the EEA countries, “a 
decision must be taken by the EEA Joint Committee on whether to include it in the EEA 
Agreement or not. The EFTA has one vote in the EEA Joint Committee, so all the EFTA 
countries must agree before an act can be included in the EEA Agreement” (2018, 71). 
Thus, the three EFTA countries have to consider the choices of the two other countries in 
this decision-shaping phase and have to reach a consensus before voting. Additionally, 
Kux and Sverdrup illustrate that Norway has the right to send experts and officials to 
Brussels to participate in “meetings of the Commission in the preparatory stage and 
implementation of new regulations and directives. At present, Norwegian experts 
participate in more than 200 different joint committees” (2000, 247). 
Kux and Sverdrup note that in the EJC, all parties have a “formal right of veto,” 
but the EFTA countries are hesitant to use this right, because the veto would affect the 
EEA agreement in its entirety (2000, 242). The reason for this hesitation is that EU 
member states “may threaten to suspend certain parts of, or terminate the entire EEA 
Agreement if the veto is used,” which endangers the unhindered market access for all 
EFTA countries, and not just the one using the veto (2000, 242).  
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What is not included in the EEA Agreement are the Common Agriculture and 
Fisheries Policies, the Customs Union, the Common Trade Policy, the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy and the Monetary Union (EMU). Eriksen explains that, as a result of 
this absence, “Norway retains the status of a sovereign state that is free to pursue its own 
foreign policy; it is seen as able to protect its own vital interests” in these areas that have 
been excluded (2015, 87). The exclusion of certain areas is especially important for the 
agricultural sector and fisheries, which are of vital interest to the country. For example, 
Norway has been the largest producer of salmon globally for over ten years (Ernst & 
Young 2017). However, Fossum and Graver illustrate that the dynamic character of the 
agreement has ensured that even parts of these areas have now been included: “40% of 
the rules and regulations that Norway incorporates are in the field of agriculture as a result 
of the agreement on veterinary issues … Important reasons for inclusion were the need 
for market access for fish and the sheer dynamics of spillover effects from related policy 
areas” (2018, 88). Nevertheless, subsidy policies in the agricultural sector and control 
over marine resources are still under national Norwegian control and are not affected by 
the EEA Agreement (2018, 89). The ability to control these specific elements of the 
sectors was the original goal for Norway to exclude them from the agreement in the first 
place (2018, 89). 
 
V. The Norway-Model and State Sovereignty 
The findings on the relationship between Norway and the EU show a large consistency 
with the rules and regulations that bind EU member states. In order to create a 
homogeneous internal market, the EU requires the three EFTA EEA members, just as EU 
member states, to adopt and implement EU regulations in a dynamic manner. The 
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dynamic nature of the agreement is key for the progressive relation between the EU and 
the EEA countries and essential to the agreement. 
Norway does not have any decision-making influence on the EU regulations that 
affect the country in policy areas that are part of the agreement. Norway is, however, able 
to influence the decision-shaping phase of new legislation in the EEA Joint Committee, 
but even this power is limited. The country has to share this ability with the two other 
EFTA countries and they have to reach a consensus, because they only have one vote 
combined in the EEA Joint Committee. Even though the advisory power in EU 
committees does provide Norway with some influence, the influence is highly informal 
and does not provide any guarantees. 
One key element in the findings is that although Norway has the formal right to 
reject EU legislation in the Joint Committee, Norway has never used this right in practice. 
The fact that Norway has never used this right to reject new legislation may suggest that 
Norway still is limited in its ability to act independently. Kux and Sverdrup explain that 
one of the main reasons for this limited ability is that although all parties have a formal 
(veto) voting right in the Joint Committee, “the legislation presented … is already agreed 
upon among the EU member states in the Council of Ministers,” and therefore, “it is 
presented as a ‘take it or leave it’ choice” (2000, 242). This choice places significant 
limitations on Norway’s ability to exercise influence and act without restrictions in the 
policy areas connected to the agreement and, thus, limits Norway’s state sovereignty. 
By contrast, Norway has been able to keep certain areas out of the main 
agreement: the ability to strike trade deals with other countries and, most importantly, the 
agriculture sector and fisheries. However, the findings show that the latter have become 
affected by EU regulations due to the dynamic character of agreement. Fossum and 
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Graver argue that, as a result, “EFTA countries have ensured market access but at the 
expense of state sovereign control and democratic self-governing, not formally speaking, 
but in actual practice” (2018, 90). Nevertheless, the fact that the subsidy policies and the 
control over marine resources are still in the hands of the national government exemplifies 
some element of control in these areas.  
Most of the institutions that were formally created with the EEA Agreement, for 
example the ESA and the EFTA Court, play a significant role in the transfer of EU law 
and regulations into the EFTA countries. Although this article does not cover all of these 
institutions extensively, what should be noted here is, as Kux and Sverdrup explain, that 
because of the agreement, “[a] complex set of joint institutions was established to control 
and monitor political, legal, social and cultural cooperation” (2000, 242). Formally, the 
institutions are part of the EEA Agreement and are separate from EU institutions. 
However, often these institutions act in accordance with EU law. 
What these findings suggest is that Norway’s state sovereignty in most areas has 
been significantly affected by its relation with the EU. The question then rises: why does 
Norway choose to remain in this relationship and not become a full EU member to gain 
more decision-making power? Fossum and Graver explain that “[t]he formal status of 
non-membership is politically important. It provides symbolic reassurance of 
constitutional-democratic sovereignty, and enables the no-parties to reassure their voters 
that as ‘parties in the electorate’ — those specific issues that the electorate associates that 
particular party with … — they have successfully managed to keep Norway out of the 
EU” (2018, 92). Thus, the formality of non-membership provides a symbolic sovereignty 
for Norway.  
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VI. Switzerland and Bilateral Agreements I (1999)  
After the referendum on EEA membership, the first set of bilateral agreements between 
Switzerland and the EU in 1999 consisted of seven sectoral agreements. The seven sectors 
that were included are: agriculture (Agricultural Products), civil aviation (Air Transport), 
Free Movement of Persons, overland transport (Carriage of Goods and Passengers by Rail 
and Road), public procurement markets (Certain Aspects of Government Procurement), 
research (Scientific and Technological Cooperation), and technical barriers to trade 
(Mutual Recognition in Relation to Conformity Assessment). In what follows, I discuss 
each of these sectors separately. I found that large parts of these agreements, and some 
completely, have taken EU regulation as the point of departure. However, in various 
agreements I also found evidence of a special deal between Switzerland and the EU.  
 
6.1 General Findings 
There are some unique elements in the relationship that become apparent in all of the 
agreements. First, all seven agreements initiate a Joint Committee (JC) on the topic of 
each individual agreement. Consequently, there is not one overarching institution that 
oversees the entire relationship between the two parties, but the relationship is regulated 
per sector. Both parties — the EU and Switzerland — have an equal voice in those 
committees. The JCs are mostly concerned with implementation, future alterations to the 
agreements, and dispute settlements. Secondly, all of the agreements state that the EU 
grants Switzerland the ‘observer status’ in European committees related to the sectoral 
agreements. Thirdly, all agreements cover only the relationship between Switzerland and 
the EU. As a result, any trade agreement with third parties, for both the EU and 
Switzerland, is not affected by these agreements. This stipulation is explicitly stated in all 
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the agreements. Fourthly, all of the agreements contain a part on early termination of the 
agreement, which is an option for both parties. However, this part also states that if one 
of the agreements is ended, all of the other six agreements are also terminated. Finally, 
none of the agreements suggest that (new) EU law has to be incorporated into Swiss law 
directly in order for the agreement to continue. New legislation is discussed and decided 
upon in each JC relevant to the policy area. In the remaining parts of this section I briefly 
present the bilateral agreements and whether there are any elements in the agreements 
that signify exemptions or exceptional deals for Switzerland. 
 
6.2 Agriculture (A) 
This agreement covers some of the areas of the agricultural sector that are important for 
the Swiss-EU trade. The aim of the agreement is “to continue to work towards achieving 
gradually greater [liberalization] of trade … in agricultural goods” (A 2002, Art. 13, par. 
1). The areas that are covered include: “Cheese, Plant Health, Animal feed, Seeds, Trade 
in Wine-Sector Products, Names of Spirit Drinks and [Aromatized] Wine-Based Drinks, 
Organically Produced Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, Recognition of Conformity 
Checks for Fruit and Vegetables Subject to Marketing Standards, and Animal-Health and 
Zootechnical Measures Applicable to Trade in Live Animals and Animal Products” 
(2002, Annexes 3-11). Although the agreement follows the EU’s acquis communautaire 
to a great extent, the agreement is not as comprehensive as the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) of the EU. The CAP covers the trade of over twenty types of products and 
is not only concerned with (the liberalization of) trade, but also with, for example, 
subsidies. 
 
22 
 
6.3 Civil Aviation (CA) 
In the agreement on air transport, there is no explicit deviation from the regulations that 
exist in the EU. For example, the agreement states that “the provisions laid down in this 
Agreement as well as in the regulations and directives specified in the Annex shall apply 
under the condition set out hereafter. Insofar as they are identical in substance to 
corresponding rules of the EU Treaty and to acts adopted in application of that Treaty” 
(CA 2002, Art. 1, par. 2). The agreement furthermore states that any future alterations to 
EU regulations in this policy area will first be processed through the relevant JC. 
 
6.4 Free Movement of Persons (FMP) 
This agreement involves the movement of people between Switzerland and the EU. Part 
of this agreement includes a special deal for Switzerland. In Article 10 there is a 
significant difference between the implementation restrictions for the Swiss side and the 
EU side. The article is concerned with “[t]ransitional provisions and development of the 
Agreement” and lays out the practical implications of the implementation (FMP 2002, 
Art. 10). The agreement came into force in 2002 and states in paragraph 1 that during the 
first five years, “Switzerland may maintain quantitative limits in respect of access to an 
economic activity for the following two categories of residence: residence for a period of 
more than four months and less than one year and residence for a period equal to, or 
exceeding one year” (2002, Art. 10, par. 1). This stipulation means that Switzerland holds 
the ability to set a quota for certain EU citizens applying for residency in Switzerland for 
five years after the enforcement of the agreement. 
Subsequently, paragraph 3 states a maximum amount of residence permits for the 
previously mentioned groups of EU residents (2002, Art. 10, par. 3). An even extra 
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possible limitation to the resident permits is explained in paragraph 4, where the 
conditionality is expanded further upon (2002, Art. 10, par. 4). In short, the agreement 
states that Switzerland has the ability to limit the amount of resident permits provided to 
EU citizens for up to twelve years after the initiation of this bilateral agreement. 
 By contrast, there is not such a restriction for Swiss citizens that apply for an EU 
residence permit. The only limitations exist in the first two years after the implementation 
of the agreement, during which both parties “may maintain the controls on the priority of 
workers integrated into the regular labour market and wage and working conditions 
applicable to nationals of the other Contracting Party” (2002, Art. 10, par. 2). This 
particular ability of control falls away after two years for both parties, leaving only the 
conditionality applied to EU citizens mentioned above. 
 
6.5 Carriage of Goods and Passengers by Rail and Road (CGPRR) 
The bilateral agreement on overland transport is concerned with transport in the broadest 
sense. Although a large part of the agreement follows EU regulations, one segment on the 
weight limit of trucks shows a special deal between the EU and Switzerland.  
 First, the agreement states in article 7, paragraph 3, that from 2005 onwards 
“Switzerland shall make its legislation on the maximum permissible weight limits for 
these vehicles in international traffic equivalent to that in force in the Community” 
(CGPRR 2002, Art. 7, par. 3). This provision means that Switzerland has to accept the 
weight limit set by the EU, which is defined in Article 8, paragraph 1 as a maximum of 
40 tons (2002, Art. 8, par. 1). Secondly, however, in relation to this acceptance, 
Switzerland is allowed to introduce “a non-discriminatory tax on vehicles” (2002, Art. 
30, par. 1). The agreement sets out a detailed description on how much Switzerland is 
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allowed to tax vehicles based on their weight, but the overall consensus is that the more 
a vehicle weighs, and therefore pollutes, the more tax Switzerland is allowed to charge 
(2002, Art. 30). 
 
6.6 Government Procurement (GP) 
This agreement affects the liberalization of certain public goods markets for both the EU 
and Switzerland. Most of the agreement follows the same liberalization processes as those 
of the EU. One significant element is stated in Article 8, paragraph 1: the “implementation 
of this Agreement shall be monitored within each Party, by an independent authority. This 
authority shall be competent to receive any complaint or grievance concerning the 
application of this Agreement and shall act promptly and effectively” (GP 2002, Art. 8, 
par. 1). Furthermore, the agreement states that within two years after 2002, the authority 
would also have the ability “to initiate proceedings or take administrative or judicial 
action” (2002, Art. 8, par. 2). This element signifies a slight difference from the other 
bilateral agreements, where the monitoring power lies with the JC. Although there is a JC 
related to this agreement, which is also concerned with disputes, this independent 
authority provides an extra autonomous body that deals with issues concerned with this 
agreement. 
 
6.7 Research (R) 
This agreement provides Switzerland unhindered access to EU research programs and 
enables an easier share of resources related to research. In exchange for the access, 
Switzerland has to pay the EU money. This amount is calculated proportionally, “to meet 
the Commission's financial obligations stemming from work to be carried out in the forms 
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necessary for the implement, management and operation of those [programs] and 
activities covered by this Agreement” (R 2002, Art. 5, par. 1). This agreement shows no 
significant difference between EU membership and the Swiss-EU relationship on this 
topic. 
 
6.8 Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
This agreement focuses on recognizing technical barriers to trade and attempts to 
harmonize “the technical regulations, standards and principles governing implementation 
of conformity assessment procedures” (TBT 2002, Statement of Agreement). There is no 
special deal in this agreement for Switzerland, and, as stated in article one, paragraph two, 
the conformity procedures “shall in particular indicate conformity with the Community 
legislation” (2002, Art. 1, par. 2). This section indicates that Switzerland has to adapt EU 
legislation in this particular policy area. 
 
VII. Switzerland and State Sovereignty 
7.1 General Consequences 
The creation of JCs for every sectoral agreement means that, formally, Switzerland not 
only has had a voice in the establishment of the agreements, but that the country maintains 
that voice in future negotiations. These negotiations can be concerned with, but are not 
limited to, disputes related to the existing agreement, implementation issues of the 
agreement, future alterations to elements of the agreement, and changes in legislation in 
either party’s own regulations. Both parties will be able to voice their concerns regarding 
each agreement equally. So, instead of having 1/28 of a voice as a member state, 
Switzerland has half of the ‘power’ in each JC. This ability to voice concerns allows the 
26 
 
country to increase the chance to influence negotiations significantly. However, these JCs 
are only concerned with the language and implementation of these bilateral agreements 
and do not have any substantial influence in EU decision-making. 
 The fact that both parties maintain the right to make deals on trade agreements 
with third countries, provides Switzerland a certain level of autonomy. As a result, the 
country has been able to make trade agreements with countries from all over the world, 
although most were made within the framework of EFTA (SECO 2018). By contrast, EU 
member states are subject to the EU’s common trade policy and are therefore not allowed 
to make their own trade deals with third countries. 
 The formal possibility of terminating one of the agreements allows Switzerland a 
positive level of control. If the country is dissatisfied with how the agreement turns out, 
it holds the capacity to dismiss the agreement. However, as mentioned in the findings, the 
clause in all the agreements states that if one of the parties cancels one agreement, all of 
the other six are also terminated. Therefore, this provision only provides control over the 
policy areas in a formal sense. 
 
7.2 Consequences for Policy Areas 
On the one hand, what becomes apparent from the findings is that Switzerland has had to 
adopt the EU regulations fully in a few areas: civil aviation, research and technical 
barriers to trade. Therefore, state sovereignty was affected by the country’s relationship 
with the EU in these areas, because the country can no longer act as an independent 
authority. On the other hand, the findings also demonstrate that there are areas in which 
Switzerland has been able to strike a special deal with the EU: agriculture, free movement 
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of persons, carriage of goods and passengers by rail and road, and government 
procurement. 
The agreement between Switzerland and the EU on agriculture allows 
Switzerland, partly, to act independently and maintain its sovereignty in this policy area. 
The deal is concerned with those products that are relevant for Switzerland and regarding 
those products, Switzerland has to adopt EU regulations. However, this agreement is not 
as extensive as the EU’s CAP and is therefore also not as intrusive. Switzerland’s 
agricultural sector is not completely integrated into the EU, which allows the country to 
make decisions on parts of this sector that are not included in the agreement. 
 In the agreement on free movement of persons the difference in conditionality 
between EU citizens and Swiss citizens during the first twelve years of this agreement 
signifies a special deal. The fact that EU member states have to eliminate all barriers for 
Swiss citizens within two years after the enforcement of the agreement and that 
Switzerland is allowed to maintain quotas and barriers for up to twelve years, is a 
significant exception. This agreement shows that the country formally has been able to 
document that it will maintain a part of its sovereign power over the influx of persons 
from the EU for a set amount of time, and that this form of control is not extended to EU 
countries. 
The fact that Switzerland is allowed to tax overland vehicles in relation to their 
weight on Swiss territory is an interesting element of the agreement on overland transport. 
The findings show that the country has to accept most of the EU regulations in this policy 
area. However, Switzerland is able to tax specifically vehicles from EU countries that 
weigh over a certain amount and thus cause more pollution. This element of control 
allows the country to make it more expensive for European vehicles that pollute more to 
28 
 
use Swiss roads. Therefore, the agreement indirectly provides Switzerland independency 
in the decision which vehicles use the roads. 
The only significant element worthy of noting in the agreement on government 
procurement in relation to state sovereignty, is the independent authority. In EU member 
states, liberalization of government procurement follows the Court of Justice of the EU, 
but the independent authority of the bilateral agreement is not formally bound by EU law. 
The agreement allows Switzerland to go to an autonomous body that deals with issues 
related to the agreement, and therefore makes the country less dependent on the JC during 
dispute settlements. The authority monitors the implementation of the agreement in both 
parties and can take judicial action. The difference from other agreements is that in those, 
half of the JC’s voice comes from the EU, whereas the authority created here is supposed 
to be independent and, therefore, can make an unbiased decision. This independent body 
does not necessarily provide Switzerland with the ability to exercise its state sovereignty 
over this policy area, but it also does not mean that the country has to cede that sovereignty 
to the EU; Switzerland transfers the control to an independent authority. 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
Although Norway and Switzerland did not become members of the EU, they did establish 
a close relationship with the EU. This article has investigated in what way this relationship 
has affected the state sovereignty of these two countries. The findings of this study reveal 
that for both affiliated non-members, state sovereignty is affected by the relationship with 
the EU. However, in the case of Norway, the effects on state sovereignty become more 
evident than in the case of Switzerland. Although both countries have made deals with 
the EU in which they have had to adopt the EU’s regulations, Switzerland appears to have 
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been able to strike some significant deals with the EU, outside of the EU’s legal 
framework. This ability means that the bilateral relationship between Switzerland and the 
EU affects state sovereignty less than the EEA relationship between Norway and the EU. 
 This study has shown that ‘sovereignty’ has a dynamic character, and that 
sovereignty is not an either/or question, whereby a country either holds sovereignty, or it 
does not. The article provides evidence that there are different levels of sovereignty. At 
first glance, it may appear as if Norway and Switzerland have similar relations with the 
EU: both countries have agreed to make deals with the EU and conform to EU regulations 
to an extent in order to gain unhindered access to the European single market. What this 
article has also shown, however, is that there are significant differences in the way in 
which sovereignty has been affected in these two countries.  
Switzerland has been able to negotiate agreements on different sectors, which 
sometimes led to a direct incorporation of EU regulation, but sometimes the country was 
able to strike a special deal. The agreements are sector-based and do not have an 
overarching institution that controls or affects them. The relationship allows Switzerland 
to retain its control over specific policy areas and act independently, and thus, the country 
maintains its sovereignty to a certain extent. At the same time, new EU legislation that 
would affect the current agreement has to be negotiated in the JCs, which provides 
Switzerland the opportunity to voice its concerns as a full partner. 
By contrast, the EEA Agreement is more intrusive and provides an encompassing 
body, because the agreement is incorporated into Norway as national law. Although the 
EEA Agreement is not as extensive as full institutionalized membership and the countries 
do not formally cede sovereignty, the agreement holds elements that foster similar 
aspects. For example, the EEA Agreement does not allow for states, e.g. Norway, to 
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negotiate individual deals with the EU on specific sectors, but requires one coherent voice 
from all three countries. At the same time, the EEA Agreement has in itself the ability to 
adopt new EU legislation, without renegotiating the original agreement. Norway has 
almost no influence on any decisions made in EU legislation that often modify the 
agreement. Furthermore, the agreement initiated several institutions that incorporate EU 
legislation.  
All of these elements contribute to the fact that this type of arrangement has a 
greater restrictive effect on sovereignty than the bilateral Swiss-EU relationship. This 
evidence is in line with the argumentation by Kux and Sverdrup that ‘Europeanization’ 
has extended beyond the formal borders of the EU and that ‘Europeanization’ has 
formally become more visible in Norway than in Switzerland. 
The research reported in this article focused only on the first set of bilateral 
agreements. There have been other sets of bilateral agreements between Switzerland and 
the EU that have not been taken into account in this study. This research has looked only 
at the official language of the bilateral agreements and not at the negotiations, speeches 
or other discourse surrounding the agreements. Further work would need to address the 
practical implications of the bilateral agreements. Such a follow up study might enable us 
to see whether the special deals that were struck on paper contribute to the ability, in 
practice, of controlling those policy areas. Research on these practical implications may 
allow us to say more about the role of sovereignty in the relationship between Switzerland 
and the EU.  
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